Where private operators openly colluded and the enforcement of operating standards was lax, such as was the case with transit deregulation in Santiago, Chile, service reliability and quality plummeted while tariffs increased. Absent managed competition and market contestability, experiences show that deregulating and privatizing public transit in large, congested cities can backfire, forcing authorities to reregulate and reinstall a public operator, as in Santiago.
While neoliberal policies of privatizing bus operations remain popular in much of Latin America and Asia, there has been less progress in attracting private capital for the construction of public transit infrastructure, particularly urban passenger rail systems. Privatization of road construction has been far more commonplace. Private concessions for the construction of public-transit systems has had a checkered past-due mainly to higher risks and difficulties in coordinating system designs and services among multiple interests. Private financing of metros in Manila, Bangkok, and Kuala Lumpur won kudos for expediting project implementation and containing construction costs, but was faulted for failing to integrate rail transit not only with other modes but even between metro lines. Ridership suffered as a result, yielding fewer mobility and environmental benefits than expected. Private takeover of existing public-transit assets has fared even worse, underscored by the British Railtrack fiasco. While costs fell when British Rail was broken into almost a hundred pieces and sold in the mid-1990s, service quality and public safety quickly plummeted (Shaw 2000) . In 2002, British Railtrack was dissolved and its assets sold to Network Rail, a state-backed, not-for-profit corporation whose profits go mainly to rail maintenance and expansion. There have been some successes following private financing of metro systems, notably in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro where ridership increased and costs fell without a noticeable decline in service quality (Estache, Carbajo, and Rus 1999, Zegras 2004) . These experiences show that privatization of public transit infrastructure works best with the expansion of existing services (versus the construction of new facilities) and in congested corridors with pent-up demand, few mobility options, and an emerging middle class (Rodriquez 1999) . Also important is the setting and enforcement of service-quality and safety standards that protect the broader public interest.
The most notable contemporary examples of private railway construction of the majority of urban rail lines, not just extensions (as has been the case in Latin America), come from two of east Asia's economic juggernauts: Hong Kong and Tokyo. What distinguishes both cases is private railway companies' reliance on property development to
